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Abstract
In 1876, Lewis Carroll proposed a voting system in which the winner is
the candidate who with the fewest changes in voters’ preferences becomes a
Condorcet winner—a candidate who beats all other candidates in pairwise
majority-rule elections. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick provided a lower bound—
NP-hardness—on the computational complexity of determining the election win-
ner in Carroll’s system. We provide a stronger lower bound and an upper bound
that matches our lower bound. In particular, determining the winner in Carroll’s
system is complete for parallel access to NP, i.e., it is complete for Θp2, for which
it becomes the most natural complete problem known. It follows that determin-
ing the winner in Carroll’s elections is not NP-complete unless the polynomial
hierarchy collapses.
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1 Introduction
The Condorcet criterion is that an election is won by any candidate who defeats all
others in pairwise majority-rule elections ([Con85], see [Bla58]). The Condorcet Paradox,
dating from 1785 [Con85], notes that not only is it not always the case that Condorcet
winners exist but, far worse, when there are more than two candidates, pairwise majority-
rule elections may yield strict cycles in the aggregate preference even if each voter has
non-cyclic preferences.1 This is a widely discussed and troubling feature of majority rule
(see, e.g., the discussion in [Mue89]).
In 1876, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson—more commonly referred to today by his pen name,
Lewis Carroll—proposed an election system that is inspired by the Condorcet criterion,2 yet
that sidesteps the abovementioned problem [Dod76]. In particular, a Condorcet winner is a
candidate who defeats each other candidate in pairwise majority-rule elections. In Carroll’s
system, an election is won by the candidate who is “closest” to being a Condorcet winner.
In particular, each candidate is given a score that is the smallest number of exchanges
of adjacent preferences in the voters’ preference orders needed to make the candidate a
Condorcet winner with respect to the resulting preference orders. Whatever candidate (or
candidates, in the case of a tie) has the lowest score is the winner. This system admits ties
but, as each candidate is assigned an integer score, no strict-preference cycles are possible.
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick, in their paper “Voting Schemes for which It Can Be Dif-
ficult to Tell Who Won the Election” [BTT89], raise a difficulty regarding Carroll’s elec-
tion system. Though the notion of winner(s) in Carroll’s election system is mathemat-
ically well-defined, Bartholdi et al. raise the issue of what the computational complexity
is of determining who is the winner. Though most natural election schemes admit ob-
vious polynomial-time algorithms for determining who won, in sharp contrast Bartholdi
et al. prove that Carroll’s election scheme has the disturbing property that it is NP-hard
to determine whether a given candidate has won a given election (a problem they dub
DodgsonWinner), and that it is NP-hard even to determine whether a given candidate has
tied-or-defeated another given candidate (a problem they dub DodgsonRanking).
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s NP-hardness results establish lower bounds for the com-
plexity of DodgsonRanking and DodgsonWinner. We optimally improve their two complexity
lower bounds by proving that both problems are hard for Θp2, the class of problems that can
be solved via parallel access to NP, and we provide matching upper bounds. Thus, we es-
tablish that both problems are Θp2-complete. Bartholdi et al. explicitly leave open the issue
of whether DodgsonRanking is NP-complete: “...Thus DodgsonRanking is as hard as an
1The standard example is an election over candidates a, b, and c in which 1/3 of the voters have preference
〈a < b < c〉, 1/3 of the voters have preference 〈b < c < a〉, and 1/3 of the voters have preference 〈c < a < b〉.
In this case, though each voter individually has well-ordered preferences, the aggregate preference of the
electorate is that b trounces a, c trounces b, and a trounces c. In short, individually well-ordered preferences
do not necessarily aggregate to a well-ordered societal preference.
2Carroll did not use this term. Indeed, Black has shown that Carroll “almost beyond a doubt” was
unfamiliar with Condorcet’s work [Bla58, p. 193–194].
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NP-complete problem, but since we do not know whether DodgsonRanking is in NP, we can
say only that it is NP-hard” [BTT89, p. 161]. From our optimal lower bounds, it follows
that neither DodgsonWinner nor DodgsonRanking is NP-complete unless the polynomial
hierarchy collapses.
As to our proof method, in order to raise the known lower bound on the complexity
of Dodgson elections, we first study the ways in which feasible algorithms can control
Dodgson elections. In particular, we prove a series of lemmas showing how polynomial-time
algorithms can control oddness and evenness of election scores, “sum” over election scores,
and merge elections. These lemmas then lead to our hardness results.
We remark that it is somewhat curious finding “parallel access to NP”-complete (i.e.,
Θp2-complete) problems that were introduced almost one hundred years before complexity
theory itself existed. In addition, DodgsonWinner, which we prove complete for this class, is
extremely natural when compared with previously known complete problems for this class,
essentially all of which have somewhat convoluted forms, e.g., asking whether a given list of
boolean formulas has the property that the number of formulas in the list that are satisfiable
is itself an odd number. In contrast, the class NP, which is contained in Θp2, has countless
natural complete problems. Also, we mention that Papadimitriou [Pap84] has shown that
UniqueOptimalTravelingSalesperson is complete for PNP, which contains Θp2.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce some standard concepts and notations from computational
complexity theory [Pap94,BC93,GJ79]. NP is the class of languages solvable in nonde-
terministic polynomial time. The polynomial hierarchy [MS72,Sto77], PH, is defined as
PH = P ∪ NP ∪ NPNP ∪ NPNP
NP
∪ · · · where, for any class C, NPC =
⋃
C∈C NP
C , and
NPC is the class of all languages that can be accepted by some NP machine that is given a
black box that in unit time answers membership queries to C. The polynomial hierarchy is
said to collapse if for some k the kth term in the preceding infinite union equals the entire
infinite union. Computer scientists strongly suspect that the polynomial hierarchy does not
collapse, though proving (or disproving) this remains a major open research issue.
The polynomial hierarchy has a number of intermediate levels. The Θp2 level of the
polynomial hierarchy will be of particular interest to us. Θp2, which was first studied by
Papadimitriou and Zachos ([PZ83], see also [Wag90]), is the class of all languages that
can be solved via O(log n) queries to some NP set. Equivalently, and more to the point
for the purposes of this paper, Θp2 equals the class of problems that can be solved via
parallel access to NP [Hem89,KSW87], as explained formally later in this section. Θp2 falls
between the first two levels of the polynomial hierarchy: NP ⊆ Θp2 ⊆ P
NP ⊆ NPNP. During
the past decade, Θp2 has played a quite active role in complexity theory. Kadin [Kad89]
has proven that if NP has a sparse Turing-complete set then the polynomial hierarchy
collapses to Θp2, Hemachandra and Wechsung have shown that the question of whether
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Θp2 and sequential access to NP yield the same class can be characterized in terms of
Kolmogorov complexity [HW91], Wagner [Wag90] has shown that the definition of Θp2 is
extremely robust, and Jenner and Tora´n [JT95] have shown that the robustness of the class
Θp2 seems to fail for its function analogs.
Problems are encoded as languages of strings over some fixed alphabet Σ having at
least two letters. Σ∗ denotes the set of all strings over Σ. For any string x ∈ Σ∗, let |x|
denote the length of x. For any set A ⊆ Σ∗, let A denote Σ∗ \ A. For any set A ⊆ Σ∗,
let ||A|| denote the cardinality of A. For any multiset A, ||A|| will denote the cardinality
of A. For example, if A is the multiset containing one occurrence of the preference order
〈w < x < y〉 and seventeen occurrences of the preference order 〈w < y < x〉, then ||A|| = 18.
As is standard, for each language A ⊆ Σ∗ we use χA to denote the characteristic function
of A, i.e., χA(x) = 1 if x ∈ A and χA(x) = 0 if x 6∈ A. Let 〈 · · · 〉 be any standard, multi-
arity, easily computable, easily invertible pairing function. We will also use the notation
〈 · · · 〉 to denote preference orders, e.g., 〈w < x < y〉. Which use is intended will be clear
from context. Whenever we speak of a function that takes a variable number of arguments,
we will assume that the arguments, say a1, . . . az, are encoded as a1# · · ·#az, where #
is a symbol not in the alphabet in which the arguments are encoded. When speaking of
a variable-arity function being polynomial-time computable, we mean that the function’s
running time is polynomial in |a1# · · ·#az| = z − 1 + |a1|+ · · ·+ |az|.
In computational complexity theory, reductions are used to relate the complexity of
problems. Very informally, if A reduces to B that means that, given B, one can solve A. For
any a and b such that ≤ba is a defined reduction type, and any complexity class C, let R
b
a(C)
denote {L | (∃C ∈ C) [L ≤ba C]}. We refer readers to the standard source, Ladner, Lynch,
and Selman [LLS75], for definitions and discussion of the standard reductions. However, we
briefly and informally present to the reader the definitions of the reductions to be used in
this paper. A ≤pm B (“A polynomial-time many-one reduces to B”) if there is a polynomial-
time computable function f such that (∀x ∈ Σ∗) [x ∈ A ⇐⇒ f(x) ∈ B]. A ≤ptt B (“A
polynomial-time truth-table reduces to B”) if there is a polynomial-time Turing machine
that, on input x, computes a query that itself consists of a list of strings and, given that
the machine after writing the query is then given as its answer a list telling which of the
listed strings are in B, the machine then correctly determines whether x is in A (this is not
the original Ladner-Lynch-Selman definition, as we have merged their querying machine
and their evaluation machine, however this formulation is common and equivalent). Since
a ≤ptt-reducing machine, on a given input, asks all its questions in a parallel (also called
non-adaptive) manner, the informal statement above that Θp2 captures the complexity of
“parallel access to NP” can now be expressed formally as the claim Θp2 = R
p
tt(NP), which
is known to hold [Hem89,KSW87].
As has become the norm, we always use hardness to denote hardness with respect to
≤pm reductions. That is, for any class C and any problem A, we say that A is C-hard if
(∀C ∈ C)[C ≤pm A]. For any class C and any problem A, we say that A is C-complete if
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A is C-hard and A ∈ C. Completeness results are the standard method in computational
complexity theory of categorizing the complexity of a problem, as a C-complete problem A
is both in C, and is the hardest problem in C (in the sense that every problem in C can be
easily solved using A).
3 The Complexity of Dodgson Elections
Lewis Carroll’s voting system ([Dod76], see also [NR76,BTT89]) works as follows. Each
voter has strict preferences over the candidates. Each candidate is assigned a score, namely,
the smallest number of sequential exchanges of two adjacent candidates in the voters’ pref-
erence orders (henceforward called “switches”) needed to make the given candidate a Con-
dorcet winner. We say that a candidate c ties-or-defeats a candidate d if the score of d is
not less than that of c. (Bartholdi et al. [BTT89] use the term “defeats” to denote what
we, for clarity, denote by ties-or-defeats; though the notations are different, the sets being
defined by Bartholdi et al. and in this paper are identical.) A candidate c is said to win the
Dodgson-type election if c ties-or-defeats all other candidates. Of course, due to ties it is
possible for two candidates to tie-or-defeat each other, and so it is possible for more than
one candidate to be a winner of the election.
Recall that all preferences are assumed to be strict. A candidate c is a Condorcet
winner (with respect to a given collection of voter preferences) if c defeats (i.e., is preferred
by strictly more than half of the voters) each other candidate in pairwise majority-rule
elections. Of course, Condorcet winners do not necessarily exist for a given set of preferences,
but if a Condorcet winner does exist, it is unique.
We now return to Carroll’s scoring notion to clarify what is meant by the sequential
nature of the switches, and to clarify by example that one switch changes only one voter’s
preferences. The (Dodgson) score of any Condorcet winner is 0. If a candidate is not
a Condorcet winner, but one switch (recall that a switch is an exchange of two adjacent
preferences in the preference order of one voter) would make the candidate a Condorcet
winner, then the candidate has a score of 1. If a candidate does not have a score of 0 or
1, but two switches would make the candidate a Condorcet winner, then the candidate has
a score of 2. Note that the two switches could both be in the same voter’s preferences,
or could be one in one voter’s preferences and one in another voter’s preferences. Note
also that switches are sequential. For example, with two switches, one could change a
single voter’s preferences from 〈a < b < c < d〉 to 〈c < a < b < d〉, where e < f will denote
the preference: “f is strictly preferred to e.” With two switches, one could also change
a single voter’s preferences from 〈a < b < c < d〉 to 〈b < a < d < c〉. With two switches
(not one), one could also change two voters with initial preferences of 〈a < b < c < d〉 and
〈a < b < c < d〉 to the new preferences 〈b < a < c < d〉 and 〈b < a < c < d〉. As noted earlier
in this section, Dodgson scores of 3, 4, etc., are defined analogously, i.e., the Dodgson score
of a candidate is the smallest number of sequential switches needed to make the given
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candidate a Condorcet winner. (We note in passing that Dodgson was before his time in
more ways than one. His definition is closely related to an important concept that is now
known in computer science as “edit-distance”—the minimum number of operations (from
some specified set of operations) required to transform one string into another. Though
Carroll’s single “switch” operation is not the richer set of operations most commonly used
today when doing string-to-string editing (see, e.g., [SK83]), it does form a valid basis
operation for transforming between permutations, which after all are what preferences are.)
Bartholdi et al. [BTT89] define a number of decision problems related to Carroll’s sys-
tem. They prove that given preference lists, and a candidate, and a number k, it is NP-
complete to determine whether the candidate’s score is at most k in the election specified
by the preference lists (they call this problem DodgsonScore). They define the problem
DodgsonRanking to be the problem of determining, given preference lists and the names of
two voters, c and d, whether c ties-or-defeats d. They prove that this problem is NP-hard.
They also prove that, given a candidate and preference lists, it is NP-hard to determine
whether the candidate is a winner of the election.
For the formal definitions of these three decision problems, a preference order is strict
(i.e., irreflexive and antisymmetric), transitive, and complete. Since we will freely identify
voters with their preference orders, and two different voters can have the same preference
order, we define a set of voters as a multiset of preference orders.
We will say that 〈C, c, V 〉 is a Dodgson triple if C is a set of candidates, c is a member
of C, and V is a multiset of preference orders on C. Throughout this paper, we assume
that, as inputs, multisets are coded as lists, i.e., if there are m voters in the voter set then
V = 〈P1, P2, . . . , Pm〉, where Pi is the preference order of the ith voter. Score(〈C, c, V 〉)
will denote the Dodgson score of c in the vote specified by C and V . If X is a decision
problem, then when we speak of an instance ofX we mean a string that satisfies the syntactic
conditions listed in the “Instance” field of the problem’s definition (or implicit in that field in
order for the problem to be syntactically well-formed—e.g., preference lists must be over the
right number and right set of candidates). As is standard, since all such syntactic conditions
in our decision problems are trivially checkable in deterministic polynomial time, this is
equivalent to the language definitions that are also common; in particular, the language
corresponding to decision problemX is the set {x |x is an instance of X, and the “Question”
of decision problem X has the answer “yes” for x}. Since reductions map between sets,
whenever speaking of or constructing reductions we use this latter formalism.
Decision Problem: DodgsonScore
Instance: A Dodgson triple 〈C, c, V 〉; a positive integer k.
Question: Is Score(〈C, c, V 〉), the Dodgson score of candidate c in the election specified
by 〈C, V 〉, less than or equal to k?
Decision Problem: DodgsonRanking
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Instance: A set of candidates C; two distinguished members of C, c and d; a multiset V
of preference orders on C (encoded as a list, as discussed above).
Question: Does c tie-or-defeat d in the election? That is, is Score(〈C, c, V 〉) ≤
Score(〈C, d, V 〉)?
Decision Problem: DodgsonWinner
Instance: A Dodgson triple 〈C, c, V 〉.
Question: Is c a winner of the election? That is, does c tie-or-defeat all other candidates
in the election?
We now state the complexity of DodgsonRanking.
Theorem 3.1 DodgsonRanking is Θp2-complete.
It follows immediately—since (a) Θp2 = NP ⇒ PH = NP, and (b) R
p
m(NP) = NP—that
DodgsonRanking, though known to be NP-hard [BTT89], cannot be NP-complete unless
the polynomial hierarchy collapses quite dramatically.
Corollary 3.2 If DodgsonRanking is NP-complete, then PH = NP.
Most of the rest of the paper is devoted to working towards a proof of Theorem 3.1.
Wagner has provided a useful tool for proving Θp2-hardness, and we state his result below
as Lemma 3.3. However, to be able to exploit this tool we must explore the structure of
Dodgson elections. In particular, we have to learn how to control oddness and evenness
of election scores, how to add election scores, and how to merge elections. We do so as
Lemmas 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7, respectively. On our way towards a proof of Theorem 3.1, using
Lemmas 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 we will first establish Θp2-hardness of a special problem that is
closely related to DodgsonRanking. This result is stated as Lemma 3.6 below. It is not
hard to prove Theorem 3.1 using Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7. Note that Lemma 3.7 gives
more than is needed merely to establish Theorem 3.1. In fact, the way this lemma is stated
even suffices to provide—jointly with Lemma 3.6—a direct proof of the Θp2-hardness of
DodgsonWinner.
Lemma 3.3 [Wag87] Let A be some NP-complete set, and let B be any set. If there
exists a polynomial-time computable function g such that, for all k ≥ 1 and all strings
x1, . . . , x2k ∈ Σ
∗ satisfying χA(x1) ≥ χA(x2) ≥ · · · ≥ χA(x2k), it holds that
||{i | xi ∈ A}|| is odd ⇐⇒ g(x1, . . . , x2k) ∈ B,
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then B is Θp2-hard.
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Lemma 3.4 There exists an NP-complete set A and a polynomial-time computable function
f that reduces A to DodgsonScore in such a way that, for every x ∈ Σ∗, f(x) = 〈〈C, c, V 〉, k〉
is an instance of DodgsonScore with an odd number of voters and
1. if x ∈ A then Score(〈C, c, V 〉) = k, and
2. if x 6∈ A then Score(〈C, c, V 〉) = k + 1.
Lemma 3.5 There exists a polynomial-time computable function DodgsonSum such that,
for all k and for all 〈C1, c1, V1〉, 〈C2, c2, V2〉, . . ., 〈Ck, ck, Vk〉 satisfying (∀j)[||Vj || is odd], it
holds that
DodgsonSum(〈 〈C1, c1, V1〉 , 〈C2, c2, V2〉, . . . , 〈Ck, ck, Vk〉 〉)
is a Dodgson triple having an odd number of voters and such that∑
j
Score(〈Cj , cj , Vj〉) = Score(DodgsonSum( 〈 〈C1, c1, V1〉 , 〈C2, c2, V2〉, . . . , 〈Ck, ck, Vk〉 〉 ) ).
Lemma 3.3, Lemma 3.4, and Lemma 3.5 together establish the Θp2-hardness of a special
problem that is closely related to the problems that we are interested in, DodgsonRanking
and DodgsonWinner. Let us define the decision problem TwoElectionRanking (2ER).
Decision Problem: TwoElectionRanking (2ER)
Instance: A pair of Dodgson triples 〈〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉〉 both having an odd number of
voters and such that c 6= d.
Question: Is Score(〈C, c, V 〉) ≤ Score(〈D, d,W 〉)?
Lemma 3.6 TwoElectionRanking is Θp2-hard.
We note in passing that 2ER is in Rptt(NP). This fact follows by essentially the same
argument that will be used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 to establish that theorem’s upper
bound. Thus, since Θp2 = R
p
tt(NP), we have—in light of Lemma 3.6—that 2ER is Θ
p
2-
complete. We also note in passing that, since one can trivially rename candidates, 2ER
3 Recall the comments/conventions of Section 2 regarding the handling of the arguments of variable-arity
functions. Wagner did not discuss this issue, but we note that his proof remains valid under the conventions
of Section 2. These conventions have been adopted as they shield Wagner’s theorem from a pathological
type of counterexample (involving large, variable numbers of length zero inputs (ǫ) followed by one other
constant-length string) noted by a referee that, without the conventions, could render Wagner’s theorem
true but never applicable.
Another difference in our statement of the theorem relative to Wagner’s is that though we state the
theorem for the class Θp
2
, Wagner used the class “PNPbf .” However, this is legal as P
NP
bf is now known to be
equal to Θp
2
(see the discussion in [KSW87, Footnote 1]).
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remains Θp2-complete in the variant in which “and such that c 6= d” is removed from the
problem’s definition.
In order to make the results obtained so far applicable to DodgsonRanking and
DodgsonWinner, we need the following lemma that tells us how to merge two elections
into a single election in a controlled manner.
Lemma 3.7 There exist polynomial-time computable functions Merge and Merge′ such
that, for all Dodgson triples 〈C, c, V 〉 and 〈D, d,W 〉 for which c 6= d and both V and W
represent odd numbers of voters, there exist Ĉ and V̂ such that
(i) Merge(〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉) is an instance of DodgsonRanking and
Merge′(〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉) is an instance of DodgsonWinner,
(ii) Merge(〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉) = 〈Ĉ, c, d, V̂ 〉 and
Merge′(〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉) = 〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉,
(iii) Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) = Score(〈C, c, V 〉) + 1,
(iv) Score(〈Ĉ, d, V̂ 〉) = Score(〈D, d,W 〉) + 1, and
(v) for each e ∈ Ĉ \ {c, d}, Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) < Score(〈Ĉ, e, V̂ 〉).
We now prove these lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Bartholdi et al. [BTT89] prove the NP-hardness of DodgsonScore
by reducing ExactCoverByThreeSets to it. However, their reduction doesn’t have the
additional properties that we need in this lemma. We will construct a reduction from
the NP-complete problem ThreeDimensionalMatching (3DM) [GJ79] to DodgsonScore that
does have the additional properties we need. Let us first give the definition of 3DM:
Decision Problem: ThreeDimensionalMatching (3DM)
Instance: Sets M , W , X, and Y , where M ⊆W ×X ×Y and W , X, and Y are disjoint,
nonempty sets having the same number of elements.
Question: Does M contain a matching, i.e., a subset M ′ ⊆ M such that ||M ′|| = ||W ||
and no two elements of M ′ agree in any coordinate?
We now describe a polynomial-time reduction f (from 3DM to DodgsonScore) having
the desired properties. Our reduction is defined by f(x) = f ′(f ′′(x)), where f ′ and f ′′ are
as described below. Informally, f ′′ turns all inputs into a standard format (instances of
3DM having ||M || > 1), and f ′ assumes its input has this format and implements the actual
reduction.
Let f ′′ be a polynomial-time function that has the following properties.
1. If x is not an instance of 3DM or is an instance of 3DM having ||M || ≤ 1, then f ′′(x)
will output an instance y of 3DM for which ||M || > 1 and, furthermore, it will hold
that y ∈ 3DM ⇐⇒ x ∈ 3DM.
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2. If x is an instance of 3DM having ||M || > 1, then f ′′(x) = x.
It is clear that such functions exist. In particular, for concreteness, let f ′′(x)
be 〈{(d, e, p), (d, e, p′)}, {d, d′}, {e, e′}, {p, p′}〉 if x is not an instance of 3DM or both
x 6∈ 3DM and x is an instance of 3DM having ||M || ≤ 1; let f ′′(x) be
〈{(d, e, p), (d′ , e′, p′)}, {d, d′}, {e, e′}, {p, p′}〉 if x is an instance of 3DM having ||M || ≤ 1 and
such that x ∈ 3DM; let f ′′(x) be x otherwise.
We now describe f ′. Let x be our input. If x is not an instance of 3DM for which
||M || > 1 then f ′(x) = 0; this is just for definiteness, as due to f ′′, the only actions of
f ′ that matter are when the input is an instance of 3DM for which ||M || > 1. So, suppose
x = 〈M,W,X, Y 〉 is an instance of 3DM for which ||M || > 1. Let q = ||W ||. Define
f ′(〈M,W,X, Y 〉) = 〈〈C, c, V 〉, 3q〉 as follows: Let c, s, and t be elements not in W ∪X ∪ Y .
Let C =W ∪X ∪ Y ∪ {c, s, t} and let V consist of the following two subparts:
1. Voters simulating elements of M . Suppose the elements of M are enumerated as
{(wi, xi, yi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ ||M ||}. (The wi are not intended to be an enumeration of
W . Rather, they take on values from W as specified by M . In particular, wj may
equal wk even if j 6= k. The analogous comments apply to the xi and yi variables.)
For every triple (wi, xi, yi) in M , we will create a voter. If i is odd, we create the
voter 〈s < c < wi < xi < yi < t < · · · 〉, where the elements after t are the elements
of C \ {s, c, wi, xi, yi, t} in arbitrary order. If i is even, we do the same, except that
we exchange s and t. That is, we create the voter 〈t < c < wi < xi < yi < s < · · · 〉,
where the elements after s are the elements of C \{s, c, wi, xi, yi, t} in arbitrary order.
2. ||M || − 1 voters who prefer c to all other candidates.
We will now show that f has the desired properties. It is immediately clear that f ′′
and f ′, and thus f , are polynomial-time computable. It is also clear from our construction
that, for each x, f(x) is an instance of DodgsonScore having an odd number of voters since,
for every instance 〈M,W,X, Y 〉 of 3DM with ||M || > 1, f ′(〈M,W,X, Y 〉) is an instance of
DodgsonScore with ||M ||+(||M ||− 1) voters, and since f ′′ always outputs instances of this
form. It remains to show that, for every instance 〈M,W,X, Y 〉 of 3DM with ||M || > 1:
(a) if M contains a matching, then Score(〈C, c, V 〉) = 3q, and
(b) if M does not contain a matching, then Score(〈C, c, V 〉) = 3q + 1.
Note that if we prove this, it is clear that f has the properties (1) and (2) of Lemma 3.4, in
light of the properties of f ′′. Note that, recalling that we may now assume that ||M || > 1,
by construction c is preferred to s and t by more than half of the voters, and is preferred
to all other candidates by ||M || − 1 of the 2||M || − 1 voters.
Now suppose that M contains a matching M ′. Then ||M ′|| = q, and every element
in W ∪ X ∪ Y occurs in M ′. 3q switches turn c into a Condorcet winner as follows. For
every element (wi, xi, yi) ∈ M
′, switch c upwards 3 times in the voter corresponding to
(wi, xi, yi). For example, if i is odd, this voter changes from 〈s < c < wi < xi < yi < t < · · · 〉
10
to 〈s < wi < xi < yi < c < t < · · · 〉. Let z be an arbitrary element of W ∪ X ∪ Y . Since
z occurs in M ′, c has gained one vote over z. Thus, c is preferred to z by ||M || of the
2||M || − 1 voters. Since z was arbitrary, c is a Condorcet winner.
On the other hand, c’s Dodgson score can never be less than 3q, because to turn c into
a Condorcet winner, c needs to gain one vote over z for every z ∈W ∪X ∪ Y . Since c can
gain only one vote over one candidate for each switch, we need at least 3q switches to turn
c into a Condorcet winner. This proves condition (a).
To prove condition (b), first note that there is a “trivial” way to turn c into a Condorcet
winner with 3q + 1 switches: Just switch c to the top of the preference order of the first
voter. The first voter was of the form 〈s < c < w1 < x1 < y1 < t < · · · 〉, where the elements
after t are exactly all elements in W ∪X ∪ Y \ {w1, x1, y1}, in arbitrary order. Switching
c upwards 3q + 1 times moves c to the top of the preference order for this voter, and gains
one vote for c over all candidates in W ∪ X ∪ Y , which turns c into a Condorcet winner.
This shows that Score(〈C, c, V 〉) ≤ 3q + 1, regardless of whether M has a matching or not.
Finally, note that a Dodgson score of 3q implies that M has a matching. As before,
every switch has to involve c and an element of W ∪X ∪ Y . (This is because c must gain
a vote over 3q other candidates—W ∪ X ∪ Y—and so any switch involving s or t would
ensure that at most 3q − 1 switches were available for gaining against the 3q members of
W ∪X ∪ Y , thus ensuring failure.) Thus, for every voter, c switches at most three times to
become a Condorcet winner. Since c has to gain one vote in particular over each element in
Y , and to “reach” an element in Y it must hold that c first switches over the elements of W
and X that due to our construction fall between it and the nearest y element (among the
||M || voters simulating elements of M—it is clear that if any switch involves at least one of
the ||M || − 1 dummy voters this could never lead to a Dodgson score of 3q for c), it must
be the case that c switches upwards exactly three times for exactly q voters corresponding
to elements of M . This implies that the q elements of M that correspond to these q voters
form a matching, thus proving condition (b).
Proof of Lemma 3.5. We define
DodgsonSum(〈 〈C1, c1, V1〉 , 〈C2, c2, V2〉, . . . , 〈Ck, ck, Vk〉 〉) = 〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉,
where Ĉ, c, and V̂ will be as constructed in this proof.
Let c = c1. Without loss of generality (by renaming if needed), we assume that c1 =
c2 = · · · = ck, and that (∀i, j)[i 6= j ⇒ Ci ∩ Cj = {c}].
Also, for each i, enumerate Ci \ {c} as {ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,||Ci||−1}. To make our preference
orders easier to read, whenever in a preference order we write in the text “
−→
Ci,” this should
be viewed as being replaced by the text string “ci,1 < ci,2 < · · · < ci,||Ci||−1.”
As our candidate set, we will take all the old candidates from the given elections, i.e.,
{c, c1,1, c1,2, . . . , c1,||C1||−1, c2,1, c2,2, . . . , c2,||C2||−1, · · · , ck,1, ck,2, . . . , ck,||Ck||−1}, plus a set S of
new “separator” candidates, whose only purpose is to avoid interference. We will ensure
that c is preferred to all elements of S by a majority of the voters.
11
Formally, let S = {si | 1 ≤ i ≤
∑
j ||Cj || · ||Vj ||}, and let Ĉ = S ∪
⋃
j Cj. As a notational
convenience, whenever in a preference order we write in the text “
−→
S ,” this should be viewed
as being replaced by the string “s1 < s2 < · · · < s||S||.” The voter set V̂ consists of the
two subparts—voters simulating voters from the underlying elections, and voters who are
“normalizing” voters. The total number of voters will be (2
∑
j ||Vj ||) − 1, which is odd as
required by the statement of the lemma being proven. We now describe the simulating voters
(the cases of 1 and k are exactly analogous to the other cases, but are stated separately just
for notational reasons):
• There will be voters simulating the voters of V1. In particular, for each voter
〈e1 < e2 < · · · < e||C1||〉 in V1, we create a voter
〈
−→
S <
−→
C2 < · · · <
−→
Ck < e1 < e2 < · · · < e||C1||〉.
Note that c is one of the ej ’s.
• For each i, 1 < i < k, there will be voters simulating the voters of Vi. In particular,
for each i, 1 < i < k, and for each voter 〈e1 < e2 < · · · < e||Ci||〉 in Vi, we create a
voter
〈
−→
S <
−→
C1 < · · · <
−−→
Ci−1 <
−−→
Ci+1 < · · · <
−→
Ck < e1 < e2 < · · · < e||Ci||〉.
Note that c is one of the ej ’s.
• There will be voters simulating the voters of Vk. In particular, for each voter
〈e1 < e2 < · · · < e||Ck||〉 in Vk, we create a voter
〈
−→
S <
−→
C1 < · · · <
−−−→
Ck−1 < e1 < e2 < · · · < e||Ck||〉.
Note that c is one of the ej ’s.
For each i, we want c’s behavior with respect to candidates in Ci to depend only on voters
that simulate Vi. That is, every candidate in Ci \ {c} should be preferred to c by exactly
half of the voters in V̂ that do not simulate Vi. To accomplish this, we add (
∑
j ||Vj ||)− 1
normalizing voters.
• There will be (
∑
j ||Vj ||) − 1 normalizing voters. Each normalizing voter will have
preferences of the form
“some of the
−→
Cj’s” < c <
−→
S < “the rest of the
−→
Cj ’s.”
Within the “some of” and “rest of” blocks, the order of the candidates can be arbi-
trary. So all that remains to do is to specify, for each particular one of the normalizing
voters, how to decide which
−→
Cj’s go to the left of c (the “some of” block), and which
go to the right of
−→
S (the “rest of” block). Let us do so. Let the normalizing voters
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be named σ1, . . ., σ(
∑
j
||Vj ||)−1
. Consider normalizing voter σq. Then, for each i, in
the preference of σq let it be the case that
−→
Ci goes to the right of
−→
S if
q ≤ ⌊||Vi||/2⌋ +
∑
j 6=i
||Vj ||,
and otherwise
−→
Ci goes to the left of c. Note that, for each i, exactly ⌊||Vi||/2⌋ +∑
j 6=i ||Vj || normalizing voters will have
−→
Ci to the right of S and exactly ⌊||Vi||/2⌋
normalizing voters will have
−→
Ci to the left of c.
Recall that c = c1 = · · · = ck. We have to prove that
∑
j Score(〈Cj , c, Vj〉) =
Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉).
First note that c is preferred to each candidate in S by
∑
j ||Vj || of the (2
∑
j ||V ||) − 1
voters in V̂ . Also, for each i, it holds that c is preferred to all candidates in Ci \ {c} by
exactly half of the voters that do not simulate Vi. To see this, note that c is preferred to
each candidate in Ci \ {c} by all voters that simulate a Vj with j 6= i, and is also preferred
by ⌊||Vi||/2⌋ of the normalizing voters. Thus, c is preferred to each candidate in Ci \ {c}
by (
∑
j 6=i ||Vj ||) + ⌊||Vi||/2⌋) of the (
∑
j 6=i ||Vj ||) + (
∑
j ||Vj ||) − 1 voters not simulating Vi,
which indeed is exactly half of the voters not simulating Vi (recall that ||Vi|| is odd).
For each i, let Ki = Score(〈Ci, c, Vi〉). Then after Ki switches in Vi, c is preferred to e by
more than ||Vi||/2 voters in Vi, for each e ∈ Ci \ {c}. This implies that after the analogous
Ki switches in V̂ (i.e., in the voters in V̂ that simulate Vi), c is preferred to e by more than
||Vi||/2 voters in that part of V̂ that simulates Vi, for each e ∈ Ci \ {c}, and thus by more
than half of the voters in V̂ . It follows that
∑
j Kj switches in voters of V̂ turn c into a
Condorcet winner. This proves that Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) ≤
∑
j Score(〈Cj , c, Vj〉).
It remains to show that Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) ≥
∑
j Score(〈Cj , c, Vj〉). Let K̂ =
Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉). Then K̂ switches in V̂ turn c into a Condorcet winner. If K̂ ≥ ||S||,
then K̂ >
∑
j Score(〈Cj , c, Vj〉), since Score(〈Cj , c, Vj〉) ≤ ||Vj || · (||Cj || − 1) and so∑
j Score(〈Cj , c, Vj〉) ≤
∑
j ||Vj || · (||Cj || − 1) <
∑
j ||Vj || · ||Cj || = ||S||. So K̂ ≥ ||S|| is
impossible, and we thus know that K̂ < ||S||. With less than ||S|| switches, c cannot gain
extra votes over candidates in (
⋃
j Cj) \ {c} in normalizing voters, as can be immediately
seen in light of the preferences of the normalizing voters. Also, for each i: Since c is already
preferred to all candidates in Ci \ {c} by all voters that simulate Vj with j 6= i, c cannot
gain extra votes over candidates in Ci \ {c} in voters simulating Vj with j 6= i. It follows
that c can gain extra votes over candidates in Ci \{c} only in voters that simulate Vi. After
K̂ switches, c is still preferred to all candidates in Ci \{c} by at most half of the voters that
do not simulate Vi, and at the same time, c has become a Condorcet winner. It follows that
after these K̂ switches, c is preferred to e by more than ||Vi||/2 of the voters that simulate
Vi, for each e in Ci \ {c}. Let Mi be the number of switches that take place in the voters of
V̂ that simulate Vi. Then Mi ≥ Score(〈Ci, c, Vi〉).
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Since this argument applies for all i, it follows that
Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) = K̂ ≥
∑
j
Mj ≥
∑
j
Score(〈Cj , c, Vj〉),
proving the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Let A and f be the NP-complete set and the reduction from
Lemma 3.4, and let DodgsonSum be the function from Lemma 3.5. We seek to apply
Lemma 3.3, using the A (i.e., 3DM) of Lemma 3.4 as the A of Lemma 3.3, using 2ER as
the B of Lemma 3.3, and using a function g that we will define in this proof as the g of
Lemma 3.3.
Let x1, . . . , x2k ∈ Σ
∗ be such that χA(x1) ≥ · · · ≥ χA(x2k). For i = 1, . . . , 2k, let
f(xi) = 〈〈Ci, ci, Vi〉,Ki〉. We will write Si for the Dodgson triple 〈Ci, ci, Vi〉. We will
compare the Dodgson score of the sum of the even Dodgson triples with the Dodgson score
of the sum of the odd Dodgson triples, i.e., we will look at the value of
Score(DodgsonSum(〈S2, S4, . . . , S2k〉))− Score(DodgsonSum(〈S1, S3, . . . , S2k−1〉)).
By Lemma 3.5, this is the same as∑
1≤i≤k
(Score(S2i)− Score(S2i−1)).
Recall that χA(x1) ≥ · · · ≥ χA(x2k). If ||{i | xi ∈ A}|| is even then, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
it holds that x2i−1 ∈ A ⇐⇒ x2i ∈ A. So, by Lemma 3.4, for each i, either Score(S2i−1) =
K2i−1 and Score(S2i) = K2i, or Score(S2i−1) = K2i−1 + 1 and Score(S2i) = K2i + 1. It
follows that, for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
Score(S2i)− Score(S2i−1) = K2i −K2i−1.
On the other hand, if ||{i | xi ∈ A}|| is odd then, for some j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, x2j−1 ∈ A
and x2j 6∈ A and, for all i 6= j, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, it holds that x2i−1 ∈ A ⇐⇒ x2i ∈ A. It
follows that Score(S2j) − Score(S2j−1) = 1 + K2j − K2j−1 and, for all i 6= j, 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
Score(S2i)− Score(S2i−1) = K2i −K2i−1.
To summarize,
Score(DodgsonSum(〈S2, S4, . . . , S2k〉))− Score(DodgsonSum(〈S1, S3, . . . , S2k−1〉)) ={ ∑
1≤i≤kK2i −
∑
1≤i≤kK2i−1 if ||{i | xi ∈ A}|| is even, and
1 +
∑
1≤i≤kK2i −
∑
1≤i≤kK2i−1 if ||{i | xi ∈ A}|| is odd.
This implies that ||{i | xi ∈ A}|| is odd if and only if
Score(DodgsonSum(〈S2, S4, . . . , S2k〉)) +
∑
1≤i≤k
K2i−1 ≥
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Score(DodgsonSum(〈S1, S3, . . . , S2k−1〉)) + 1 +
∑
1≤i≤k
K2i.
For any integer m ≥ 1, define a Dodgson triple
Tm = 〈{i | 1 ≤ i ≤ m+ 1}, 1, {〈1 < 2 < 3 < · · · < m+ 1〉}〉.
Then Tm has an odd number of voters (namely one), and Score(Tm) = m. Thus, again by
Lemma 3.5, ||{i | xi ∈ A}|| is odd if and only if
Score(DodgsonSum(〈S2, S4, . . . , S2k, T∑
1≤i≤k
K2i−1
〉)) ≥
Score(DodgsonSum(〈S1, S3, . . . , S2k−1, T1+
∑
1≤i≤k
K2i
〉)).
Given x1, . . . , x2k, define the function g(x1, . . . , x2k) = 〈〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉〉, where
〈C, c, V 〉 = DodgsonSum(〈S1, S3, . . . , S2k−1, T1+
∑
1≤i≤k
K2i
〉)
and
〈D, d,W 〉 = DodgsonSum(〈S2, S4, . . . , S2k, T
∑
1≤i≤k
K2i−1
〉),
and (without loss of generality, via trivial renaming if necessary) c 6= d.
Note that g(x1, . . . , x2k) is computable in time polynomial in |x1|+ |x2|+ · · ·+ |x2k|+
2k − 1 (recall the conventions regarding variable-arity functions discussed in Section 2 and
footnote 3). Since
Score(〈C, c, V 〉) ≤ Score(〈D, d,W 〉)⇐⇒ ||{i | xi ∈ A}|| is odd,
it follows by Lemma 3.3 that the problem 2ER is Θp2-hard.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. Without loss of generality, we assume that ||V || ≥ ||W ||
and that C ∩D = ∅. Also, enumerate C \ {c} as {c1, c2, . . . , c||C||−1}, and D \ {d} as
{d1, d2, . . . , d||D||−1}.
The construction and proof are similar in flavor to the construction and proof of
Lemma 3.5. However, in this proof, the number of voters has to be even, as we seek
to ensure that c is preferred to d by exactly half of the voters.
We define a set of “separating” candidates: S = {si |1 ≤ i ≤ 2(||C||·||V ||+||D||·||W ||)}.
We will also use another set of separating candidates, T = {ti | 1 ≤ i ≤ ||S||}, of the same
cardinality as S. Let m = ||S||/2. Let Ĉ = C ∪D∪S ∪T . The set of new voters V̂ consists
of the following subparts:
(a) Voters simulating V : for each voter 〈e1 < e2 < · · · < e||C||〉 in V , we create a voter
〈d < s1 < · · · < s||S|| < d1 < · · · < d||D||−1 < t1 < · · · < t||T || < e1 < e2 < · · · < e||C||〉.
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(b) Voters simulating W : for each voter 〈e1 < e2 < · · · < e||D||〉 in W , we create a voter
〈t1 < · · · < t||T || < c < s1 < · · · < s||S|| < c1 < · · · < c||C||−1 < e1 < e2 < · · · < e||D||〉.
In addition, we create ||V ||+1 normalizing voters (recall that ||V || and ||W || are both odd),
consisting of three subparts:
(c) ⌈||V ||/2⌉ − ⌈||W ||/2⌉ voters:
〈t1 < · · · < t||T || < c < s1 < · · · < s||S|| < c1 < · · · < c||C||−1 < d1 < · · · < d||D||−1 < d〉.
(d) ⌈||V ||/2⌉ voters:
〈t1 < · · · < t||T || < c1 < · · · < c||C||−1 < d1 < · · · < d||D||−1 < s||S|| < · · · < s1 < c < d〉.
(e) ⌈||W ||/2⌉ voters:
〈t1 < · · · < t||T || < c1 < · · · < c||C||−1 < d1 < · · · < d||D||−1 < s1 < · · · < s||S|| < d < c〉.
The above construction of Ĉ and V̂ defines our functions Merge(〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉) =
〈Ĉ, c, d, V̂ 〉 and Merge′(〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉) = 〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉. These functions clearly satisfy
properties (i) and (ii) of Lemma 3.7.
To satisfy properties (iii) and (iv), we have to prove that Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) =
Score(〈C, c, V 〉) + 1 and that Score(〈Ĉ, d, V̂ 〉) = Score(〈D, d,W 〉) + 1.
First note that c is preferred to every candidate in S ∪ D \ {d} by ||V || + ⌈||V ||/2⌉ +
⌈||W ||/2⌉ of the 2||V ||+ ||W ||+1 voters in V̂ . Similarly, d is preferred to every candidate in
S ∪C \ {c} by ||W ||+ ||V ||+1 of the 2||V ||+ ||W ||+1 voters in V̂ . Similarly, c is preferred
to each t ∈ T by all voters in V̂ , and d is preferred to each t ∈ T by ||V ||+ ||W ||+ 1 of the
2||V ||+ ||W ||+ 1 voters in V̂ .
In addition, c is preferred to all candidates in C \{c} by ⌈||V ||/2⌉+ ⌈||W ||/2⌉ = (||V ||+
||W ||)/2 + 1 of the ||V ||+ ||W ||+ 1 voters that do not simulate V . Likewise, d is preferred
to all candidates in D \{d} by ||V ||+1 of the 2||V ||+1 voters not simulating W . Finally, c
is preferred to d by ||V ||+ ⌈||W ||/2⌉ = (2||V ||+ ||W ||+1)/2 of the 2||V ||+ ||W ||+1 voters
in V̂—exactly half.
Let K = Score(〈C, c, V 〉). Then after K switches in V̂ , c is preferred to e by
more than ||V ||/2 voters in that part of V̂ that simulates V , for every e ∈ C \ {c},
and thus by more than half of the voters in V̂ . It follows that after K switches,
c is preferred to e by a majority of voters, for all e ∈ Ĉ \ {c, d}. If, in addi-
tion to these K switches, we switch c and d in a normalizing voter of the form
〈t1 < · · · < t||T || < c1 < · · · < c||C||−1 < d1 < · · · < d||D||−1 < s||S|| < · · · < s1 < c < d〉, then
c has become a Condorcet winner. Thus Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) ≤ K + 1 = Score(C, c, V ) + 1. In
exactly the same way, we can show that Score(〈Ĉ, d, V̂ 〉) ≤ Score(〈D, d,W 〉) + 1.
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It remains to show that Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) ≥ Score(〈C, c, V 〉) + 1 and that
Score(〈Ĉ, d, V̂ 〉) ≥ Score(〈D, d,W 〉) + 1. Let K̂ = Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉). Then K̂ switches
in V̂ turn c into a Condorcet winner. Recall that m = ||S||/2. If K̂ ≥ m, then
K̂ > Score(〈C, c, V 〉) + 1, since Score(〈C, c, V 〉) < ||C|| · ||V || < m (recall ||W || is odd
and thus nonzero, and without loss of generality we assume ||D|| > 0). So K̂ ≥ m
is impossible, which implies that K̂ < m. In order to become a Condorcet winner, c
in particular needs to gain one vote over d. With less than m switches, the only way
in which c can gain this vote is by switching c and d in a normalizing voter of the
form 〈t1 < · · · < t||T || < c1 < · · · < c||C||−1 < d1 < · · · < d||D||−1 < s||S|| < · · · < s1 < c < d〉.
This uses one of the K̂ switches.
With less than m switches, c cannot gain extra votes over candidates in C \ {c} in
normalizing voters, or in voters that simulate W . It follows that c can gain extra votes over
candidates in C \ {c} only in voters that simulate V . After K̂ switches, c is still preferred
to all candidates in C \ {c} by at most the smallest possible majority of the (odd) number
of voters that do not simulate V , and at the same time, c has become a Condorcet winner.
Since ||V || is odd, it follows that, after these K̂ switches, c is preferred to e by more than
||V ||/2 voters that simulate V , for every e in C \ {c}. Let K̂V be the number of switches
that take place in the voters of V̂ that simulate V . Then K̂V ≥ Score(〈C, c, V 〉). Since we
had to use one switch to switch c and d in a normalizing voter,
Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) = K̂ ≥ K̂V + 1 ≥ Score(〈C, c, V 〉) + 1.
The same argument can be used to show that
Score(〈Ĉ, d, V̂ 〉) ≥ Score(〈D, d,W 〉) + 1,
which proves properties (iii) and (iv).
Finally, we prove property (v) of the lemma: For each e ∈ Ĉ \ {c, d}, Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) <
Score(〈Ĉ, e, V̂ 〉). First note that we have chosen S sufficiently large to ensure that
Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) < m, since Score(〈C, c, V 〉) < ||C|| · ||V || < m and Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) =
Score(〈C, c, V 〉) + 1 by property (iii).
Consider t||T ||. In order to become a Condorcet winner, t||T || must in particular outpoll
d in pairwise elections. In the specified preferences, t||T || is preferred to d by ||V || of the
2||V || + ||W || + 1 voters in V̂ . Thus, more than ⌈||W ||/2⌉ of the voters not simulating V
must be convinced to prefer t||T || to d. However, to gain even one additional vote over d
amongst the voter groups (b), (c), (d), and (e), t||T || would require more than m switches
upwards. Since Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) < m, the score of c is less than that of t||T ||. The same
argument applies to any ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ ||T ||.
Consider s||S||. In order to become a Condorcet winner, s||S|| must in par-
ticular outpoll c in pairwise elections. Initially, s||S|| is preferred to c by
||W ||+ ⌈||V ||/2⌉ − ⌈||W ||/2⌉ = ⌈||V ||/2⌉ + ⌈||W ||/2⌉ − 1 voters, namely those belonging to
17
(b) and (c). Thus, more than ⌈||V ||/2⌉ of the voters amongst (a), (d), and (e) must be
convinced to prefer s||S|| to c. However, to gain one more vote over c in (a), s||S|| would
need more than m switches upwards. Likewise, for s||S|| to gain one more vote over c in (d),
it would also have to switch more than m times upwards. Finally, to gain one more vote
over c in (e), s||S|| needs only two switches per vote. However, since there are no more
than ⌈||W ||/2⌉ ≤ ⌈||V ||/2⌉ voters in (e) and s||S|| needs to be preferred over c by more than
⌈||V ||/2⌉ additional voters, s||S|| cannot become a Condorcet winner by changing only the
minds of the voters in (e). It follows that Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) < Score(〈Ĉ, s||S||, V̂ 〉).
Consider s1. As above, for s1 to become a Condorcet winner, more than ⌈||V ||/2⌉ of
the voters amongst (a), (d), and (e) must be convinced to prefer s1 to c in particular. Now,
to gain one vote in either (a) or (e) requires more than m switches. However, similarly to
the previous paragraph, the remaining ⌈||V ||/2⌉ voters in (d) alone are too few to make
s1 a Condorcet winner. It follows that Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) < Score(〈Ĉ, s1, V̂ 〉). Note that for
each s ∈ S \ {s1, s||S||}, at least one of the two given arguments (the one for s||S|| and the
one for s1) apply, yielding Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) < Score(〈Ĉ, s, V̂ 〉), since each such s needs more
than m switches (because m = ||S||/2) to gain one vote in either (d) or (e).
Finally, consider d||D||−1. As was the case for the elements of S, more than
⌈||V ||/2⌉ of the voters amongst (a), (d), and (e) must be convinced to prefer d||D||−1
to c in order for d||D||−1 to become a Condorcet winner. However, more than m
switches would be required to gain even one vote from one of (a), (d), or (e). Thus
Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) < Score(〈Ĉ, d||D||−1, V̂ 〉). The same argument applies to each element in
(C ∪D) \ {c, d}. To summarize, we have shown that property (v) holds.
Having proven these lemmas, we may now turn to the proof of the Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. To prove the Θp2-completeness of DodgsonRanking, we must
according to the definition prove both an upper bound (DodgsonRanking ∈ Θp2) and a lower
bound (DodgsonRanking is Θp2-hard).
To prove the lower bound, it suffices to provide a ≤pm-reduction, f , from 2ER to
DodgsonRanking. f is defined as follows. Let to be some fixed string that is not in
DodgsonRanking. f(x) is defined as being to if x is not an instance of 2ER, and as being
Merge(x1, x2) otherwise, where x = 〈x1, x2〉 and Merge is as defined in Lemma 3.7. Note
that Merge and thus f are polynomial-time computable. Note also that for any instance
〈〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉〉 of 2ER, it holds that if 〈Ĉ, c, d, V̂ 〉 = Merge(〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉), then
〈〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉〉 ∈ 2ER ⇐⇒ 〈Ĉ, c, d, V̂ 〉 ∈ DodgsonRanking
by properties (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 3.7. Note also that for any input x that is not an
instance of 2ER, f(x) maps to to, a string that is not in DodgsonRanking. Thus, f is a ≤
p
m-
reduction from 2ER to DodgsonRanking. From Lemma 3.6, Θp2-hardness of DodgsonRanking
follows immediately.
Finally, we claim that DodgsonRanking is in Θp2. This can be seen as follows. We can in
parallel ask all plausible DodgsonScore queries for each of the two designated candidates,
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say c and d, and from this compute the exact score of each of c and d and thus we can tell
whether c ties-or-defeats d. Note that there is a polynomial upper bound on the highest
possible score (this is what was meant above by “plausible”), and thus this procedure indeed
can be implemented via a polynomial-time truth-table reduction to the NP-complete set
DodgsonScore. However, the class of languages accepted via polynomial-time truth-table
reductions to NP sets coincides with Θp2 [Hem89,KSW87]. This establishes the upper bound,
i.e., that DodgsonRanking ∈ Θp2.
DodgsonWinner is similarly Θp2-complete.
Theorem 3.8 DodgsonWinner is Θp2-complete.
Corollary 3.9 If DodgsonWinner is NP-complete, then PH = NP.
Bartholdi et al. [BTT89] have stated without proof that DodgsonRanking ≤pm
DodgsonWinner. Theorem 3.1 plus this assertion would prove Theorem 3.8. However,
as we wish our proof to be complete, we now prove Theorem 3.8. (We note in passing that
our paper implicitly provides an indirect proof of their assertion. In particular, given that
one has proven Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.8, the assertion follows, since it follows from
the definition of Θp2-completeness that all Θ
p
2-complete problems are ≤
p
m-interreducible.)
Proof of Theorem 3.8. As in the case of DodgsonRanking, DodgsonWinner ∈ Θp2 is easily
seen to hold, since we can in parallel ask all plausible DodgsonScore queries for each of the
given candidates (note that the number of candidates and the highest possible score for each
candidate are both polynomially bounded in the input length) and thus can compute the
exact Dodgson score for each candidate. After having done so, it is easy to decide whether
or not the designated candidate c ties-or-defeats all other candidates in the election. This
proves the upper bound.
To prove the lower bound, we will provide a polynomial-time many-one reduction
from 2ER to DodgsonWinner. By Lemma 3.6, the claim of this theorem then follows. In
fact, the following function f provides a polynomial-time many-one reduction from 2ER to
DodgsonWinner. Let to be some fixed string that is not in DodgsonWinner. f(x) is defined
as being to if x is not an instance of 2ER, and as being Merge
′(x1, x2) otherwise, where
x = 〈x1, x2〉 and Merge
′ is as defined in Lemma 3.7. To see that this is correct, note that f
is polynomial-time computable, and that when x is not an instance of 2ER then f(x) is not
in DodgsonWinner.
We now turn to the behavior of f(x) when x is an instance of 2ER. Given any pair of
Dodgson triples, 〈C, c, V 〉 and 〈D, d,W 〉, for which both ||V || and ||W || are odd and c 6= d,
let 〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉 = Merge′(〈C, c, V 〉, 〈D, d,W 〉). Assume Score(〈C, c, V 〉) ≤ Score(〈D, d,W 〉).
By properties (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 3.7, it follows that Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) ≤ Score(〈Ĉ, d, V̂ 〉)
as well. However, since by property (v) of Lemma 3.7 Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) < Score(〈Ĉ, e, V̂ 〉)
for every e ∈ Ĉ \ {c, d}, it follows that c is a winner of the election specified by Ĉ and V̂ .
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Conversely, assume Score(〈C, c, V 〉) > Score(〈D, d,W 〉). Again, properties (iii) and (iv) of
Lemma 3.7 imply that Score(〈Ĉ, c, V̂ 〉) > Score(〈Ĉ, d, V̂ 〉). Thus, c is not a winner of the
election specified by Ĉ and V̂ .
Finally, recall that our multisets are specified as a list containing, for each voter, the
preference order of that voter. Our main theorem, Theorem 3.8, proves that checking
if a candidate is a Dodgson winner is Θp2-complete. Is this complexity coming from the
number of candidates, or is the problem already complex with, for example, fixed numbers
of candidates? In fact, for each fixed constant k, there clearly is a polynomial-time algorithm
to compute (all) Dodgson scores, and thus all Dodgson winners, in elections having at most
k candidates.
Proposition 3.10 [BTT89] Let k be any fixed positive integer. There is a polynomial-time
algorithm Ak that computes all Dodgson scores (and thus all Dodgson winners) in Dodgson
elections having at most k candidates.
Proposition 3.10 in no way conflicts with Theorem 3.8. In fact, though each Ak is
a polynomial-time algorithm, the degree of the polynomial runtimes of the Ak is itself
exponential in k. It is also known that, for each fixed constant k, there is a polynomial-time
algorithm to compute all Dodgson winners in elections having at most k voters [BTT89].
4 Conclusions
This paper establishes that testing whether a given candidate wins a Dodgson election
is Θp2-complete, thus providing the first truly natural complete problem for the class Θ
p
2.
In this paper, we assumed that no voter views any two candidates as being of equal
desirability. However, note that if one allows such ties, our Θp2-hardness result remains
valid, as our case is simply a special case of this broader problem. On the other hand, it
is not hard to see that the broader problem remains in Θp2 (in both of the natural models
of switches involving ties, i.e., the model in which moving from 〈a = b < c〉 to 〈c < a = b〉
requires just one switch, and the model in which this requires two separate switches). Thus,
this broader problem is also Θp2-complete.
Since this paper first appeared, some related work has been done that may be of interest
to readers of this paper. Hemaspaandra and Wechsung [HW97] have shown that the mini-
mization problem for boolean formulas is Θp2-hard; it remains open whether that problem is
Θp2-complete. Hemaspaandra and Rothe [HR97] have shown that recognizing the instances
on which the greedy algorithm can obtain independent sets that are within a certain fixed
factor of optimality is itself a Θp2-complete task. Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe
have discussed the relationship between raising a problem’s lower bound from NP-hardness
to Θp2-hardness and its potential solvability via such modes of computation as randomized
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and approximate computing [HHR97].
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